miércoles, 14 de marzo de 2007

Seychelles

Seychelles has never participated in UN peacekeeping operations. Seychelles has had a chaotic history. After an ominous, post-independence start which saw them lurch from a coup, through an invasion by mercenaries to an abortive army mutiny and several coup attempts, the Seychelles have attained stability and prosperity (BBC 2006ba, par. 1). Thus, this situation made Seychelles’ internal political environment to be focused on finding a way to create stability and economic development. Participating in peacekeeping is not yet part of the strategy.

Initial variables of the data collection process:

UN/UN peacekeeping policy reform
No record.

Perception of peacekeeping
No record.

Domestic political environment
After 27 years as president, René officially handed over power to the vice-president, Michel, in April 2004 (EIU 2006am, 5).

The move was not unexpected, as the March 2003 [Congress of the Seychelles People’s Progressive Front] SPPF annual conference had already named Michel as the party’s candidate for the 2006 presidential election, and the constitution allows the vice-president to take over the presidency for the remainder of the term if the incumbent leaves office. Despite the handover, there has been little actual change in the government of the country, which is unsurprising, since Michel has been responsible for managing day-to-day government business for several years and was clearly René’s chosen successor. (Ibid., 6)

Michel—who took over from the former ruler, France Albert René, in 2004—won a first election in his own right in late July 2006 to keep the presidency under the control of the long-term ruling party, the SPPF (EIU 2006cj, 1). There was no need of a UN peace operation. International observers concluded that the poll was "free and fair" (Ibid.). The result was a bitter blow to the opposition but has been accepted without protest (Ibid.). Michel has named his new cabinet, comprising ten ministers, up from seven previously (Ibid.). In his political agenda, participation in peacekeeping as not been discussed.

Domestic economic environment
The services sector including transport, communications, commerce and tourism dominates the Seychelles economy and has accounted for just under 70% of GDP in recent years (EIU 2006am, 15). There are no signs that the government might seek employment for its citizens as peacekeepers. The main concern with the reform process is whether the government will really enact the announced changes: similar measures have been proposed in the past and not carried out (Ibid., 18). There is also the problem of transparency (Ibid.). In addition, the government has promised a fair and transparent privatization process, under the auspices of the National Tender Board, but Seychelles’ record to date has been poor (Ibid.).

Military affairs
Seychelles’ defence forces were established in 1977, with initial training provided by Tanzania (Ibid., 10). It comprises the army and a paramilitary National Guard (Ibid.). Numbers declined significantly in the 1990s in line with political liberalization (Ibid.). US sources state that Seychelles also has a 300-strong Presidential Protection Unit (Ibid.).

Foreign policy
Foreign policy is based on the positive non-alignment (Ibid., 9). The René regime has followed a self-described policy of “positive” nonalignment that was characterized by the development of relations with the Soviet Union, Libya and North Korea (Ibid.). Two of those countries have never contributed troops either.

International events also influenced its foreign policy. The most important was the end of the Cold War. This changed the balance of Seychelles’ priorities and obliged the country to end relations with the so-called pariah states—and commit itself to political and economic liberalization—to keep Western aid flowing (Ibid.). Nevertheless, “Seychelles has continued to lean towards the left of the non-aligned spectrum” (Ibid.).

A new foreign policy blueprint was announced in mid-2005 (Ibid., 10). This has five themes: reinforcing ties with traditional allies; building closer links with Indian Ocean neighbors; renewing support for regional organizations that promote the problems of being a small island; promoting the uniqueness and safety of the islands as a tourist destination; and promoting the country’s efforts to protect the environment (Ibid.). Peacekeeping is not in the agenda.
Of these themes, potentially the most difficult is that of renewing support for regional organizations, as the issue of membership fees has been of concern (Ibid., 11).

The government claims that fees based on GDP per head discriminate against Seychelles’ tiny population, and has not paid fees to the UN or the AU on time (Seychelles’ voting rights in the AU are currently suspended). The country also withdrew its membership of the…SADC, which it joined in 1997. However, it has retained its membership of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) and is increasingly focusing on building partnerships within the Indian Ocean region. Seychelles joined the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC) in 1999; it hosts the Indian Ocean Tourism Organization (IOTO) and is a key member of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). It is also a member of the Indian Ocean Commission, which seeks to promote sustainable development in the islands in the southeast Indian Ocean. (Ibid.)

Additional variables found after the preliminary analysis:

Climate changes

No record.

Independent negotiations taken by DPKO to seek troops
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by contributor countries to engage non-contributor countries
No record.

Meetings organized by other international organizations to engage in dialogue about peacekeeping
No record.